

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BLOGGERS ROUNDTABLE VIA TELECONFERENCE SUBJECT: RELEASE OF  
FM 3-07, STABILITY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE BRIEFERS: GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL;  
COLONEL STEVE LEONARD TIME: 3:06 P.M. EDT DATE: MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2008

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LINDY KYZER (Army Public Affairs): Hi, this is Lindy Kyzer with Army  
Public Affairs again. Can everyone hear me, or anyone hear me?

Q I can hear you, Lindy.

Q I can hear you, Lindy.

MS. KYZER: Excellent. And again, I'm going to continually apologize  
for our audio quality.

Thank you so much for joining us for today's Bloggers Roundtable. As I  
said earlier, we are live from the Association of the United States Army  
Conference. Because of that, we are going to have issues with audio quality.  
As you can hear, people are really excited that we're having a Bloggers  
Roundtable. I believe that we just had the audio go up extensively just in the  
past five minutes.

We're pleased to have with us Lieutenant General William Caldwell,  
commanding general, Fort Leavenworth and the Combined Arms Center; also  
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard, chief operational level doctrine with the  
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. They're here to discuss FM 3-07, Stability  
Operations, released this morning and now available at [www.leavenworth.army.mil](http://www.leavenworth.army.mil).

Again, I award the first question to whoever has read the entire manual  
cover to cover between this morning and now.

Following a few minutes of remarks, we'll take questions. Please  
remember to keep your mute button on when not asking questions. I will do my  
best to get the unruly public affairs officers around us to quiet down, but I am  
going to apologize. We're having some background noise now, so you will hear  
some background on our part.

Thank you very much again, Lieutenant General Caldwell, for taking the  
time to be here. I'll let you begin with your opening remarks.

GEN. CALDWELL: Hey, this is Bill Caldwell. And I just want to, first  
of all, thank everybody for what you all do as military bloggers. It really is  
such a critical thing. And I do want to say I'm sorry I missed seeing you all  
in Vegas. I'm not quite sure how my staff scheduled me to be at NTC at a time

when I could have been in Vegas, but somehow they did manage to do that. I think we've got that corrected for the future, though. But I am sorry I missed you all out there at the bloggers conference.

I did want to just -- for those who don't know what we do out at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, it is our home base. We oversee 17 schools and centers for the United States Army from there, to include obviously all the activities at Fort Leavenworth itself, which includes Command General Staff College and all the associated other organizations, of which specifically affecting today is our doctrine development and our lessons learned out there.

As you all know, one of the key things we do as the developers of doctrine for the United States Army is that is, in fact, what drives change. And by driving change, we set into effect the entire DOTMILPF (note: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) revisitation that occurs after a piece of new doctrine comes out, looking at everything from doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, policies, and obviously facilities.

So anyway, with me today I've got Steve Leonard. Steve has been the lead author for this manual. He started it about a year ago, putting it together. It is the follow-on companion, obviously, to FM 3-0. FM 3-0 came out last February, as you all know. And in that, General Casey established stability operations as being equal and as important as offense and defensive operations. And that obviously was the key starting point, by working to achieve a balance, recognizing that at any time that we're doing offense or defense, we're doing some level or degree of stability operations. And then there are varying times when stability operations will be predominant too.

So he had us take and codify that into this manual that Steve has been working diligently on with the entire -- not only the interagency, but all of our friends and partners, multinational elements, nongovernmental organizations, private organizations. And he has spent 10 months leading a charge for us for that. So he's here too and can also help answer whatever questions you may have from us.

But with that, what I'd like to do is we'll probably learn more by listening to your questions. So why don't I open it up and let you all ask whatever you want to ask either Steve or me. If it gets tough, Steve's got it. If I can handle it, I'll take it.

MS. KYZER: Spencer, did you have a question?

Q Sure, yes.

Thanks very much, General Caldwell. Thanks very much, Colonel Leonard.

I wanted to ask you a question based on something that I've heard from both people who are being stab ops boosters and people who are stab ops skeptics or detractors, which is, to what degree will the manual drive institutional change in terms of budget allocation, programs being canceled, stuff either being bought, not bought, or shifted around?

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, I think, like any (appeasment ?) doctrine when it comes out, we're going to go through the entire DOTMILPF analysis and look at that. I think what's important is, first of all, and foremost of anything, is that this is a significant mind shift in our Army. We have always conducted

stability operations. In fact, if you go back and look since the beginning of our Army's history, you know, it is very challenging to find any instances where we had not conducted them to some significant amount of degree.

And so what we have done with this manual is we have codified it now into doctrine, so it becomes a piece of what we do. We have not previously done that before. So that is a major mind shift. Already we are starting to see changes in the way we conduct training out at our training centers, of which we also have oversight for the operations groups, both at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Leavenworth. We have already brought into and incorporated into them more stability operations type of tasks than we've ever had before. If you would have gone there before 9/11 and then go there today, you'll see the significant difference that's already occurring in that respect out there too. And then the next thing is we'll be incorporating into our education and training programs, which is a key part -- we oversee all the captains' career courses and training programs of instructions that take place there, along with a lot of other elements of military instruction. And so you'll see that being worked into the educational process too.

COL. LEONARD: Hey, Spencer, I can actually add on to that a little bit, and that's that, just like General Caldwell said, a lot of these changes are already taking place. And the beauty of this whole process is that we've always done stability operations. So the cost in terms of change is not going to be that significant. It's the intellectual capital that was probably the most significant piece that we were mixing, and that cost one year's salary of a lieutenant colonel to get it done and to get it in place. And that's a pretty cheap tradeoff at the end of the day when you look at it. But that's what we didn't have. We had great doctrine for the destructive capability, the offense and defensive capabilities of the force. We've always had those. But what we didn't have was a complementary doctrine that supported how to do this in terms of the soldier in the field to understand.

And that's where we made our most money, and that's where the focus has been.

What you're going to see in terms of follow-on changes, there's going to be some changes in organization, but that's not probably going to come at that great of a cost. Overall it's a balance in the force is what we're looking for.

Q But did that have a kind of budgetary component to it in terms of programs being perhaps changed, canceled, rethought? Sorry to ask a follow-up.

GEN. CALDWELL: No, I see what you're getting. There is some -- there will be some budgetary impact. A simple example would be General Casey, as we wrote 3-0 and made stability operations that much more important, he recognized the need for us to do more interagency exchange programs and invite more of the interagency to educate with us. So if you were to go out to Fort Leavenworth today and look at our Command General Staff College, whereas last year we had two people from the interagency out there educating with us, we have 14 this year, with a goal to grow to 50.

He also gave us 20 Army officers that we were able to offer back to the interagency so that, for each person they sent from USAID, State Department, Treasury, wherever, if they wanted a U.S. military Army officer to back-fill that position for one year, although they may not have the requisite background

and training, you're going to get a dedicated, committed, smart, intelligent combat veteran who's willing to come in and work in that department or agency for a year. And we've done that and placed those officers into the interagency positions.

So already we're doing it with military personnel. We're bringing them out to the college, that instruction. Obviously we don't charge them anything, because we benefit as much from having them as a part of our classroom discussions and small-group seminars as we believe they will take back themselves. So we are already, like Steve said, working to implement a lot of this. And this doctrine now codifies it all in writing.

Q Thanks so much. MS. KYZER: Thanks, Spencer.

Dave Dilegge with Small Wars Journal, did you have a question?

Q Yes, Lindy.

Good afternoon, General Caldwell and Lieutenant Colonel Leonard. I really appreciate your taking the time to talk to us today. I also wanted to, before I ask my question, congratulate you guys out there at the Combined Arms Center for your Web pages and blogs. It really looks like a lot of hard work went into that effort. And I can't help but think that it will pay dividends in supporting your call, General Caldwell, on changing the organizational culture.

I know this may sound a little premature. I've worked on similar documents in the past in my Marine Corps history. There always seems to be a few items that you kind of thought that you might not have really nailed down. And I know the document, 3-07, just got released today. But are there any sections or issues you believe that you may need to expand on? Really, are there any gaps that you believe you'll need to be -- that will need to be addressed at a later date? Thank you.

GEN. CALDWELL: Dave, I can probably hit that one first.

Within a 10-month period of time, we got all the big pieces in place that were needed to do. But there's always things that we're going to have to go back and relook. And I think probably the biggest piece is the last chapter of the book on security sector reform, because that is the -- that's the golden nugget in the book. And that's the key to success overall, because that ties in efforts across multiple sectors. It brings into play every single stakeholder that's involved in one of these operations.

And even as we wrote, the government is still working out draft policy on security sector reform, the Defense Diplomacy Development Policy that's ongoing. And it's really hard to get all those places, those pieces perfectly right, when the policy is still in development. You're riding a bow wave and trying not to go underwater. And we did as best as we could to get as much of that right.

But there's key aspects of that that still have to be fleshed out, not the least of which is security force assistance, which I know that you guys at the Small Wars Journal are intimately involved with and, you know, it's a hot topic for you. But it's something that -- that effort is ongoing. You know, I think we could probably use a whole manual on that alone. But how you tie that in with how you develop a functioning penal system, how you train and mentor a new judiciary, how you tie all that back into civilian control and oversight of

the defense sector, all that is very -- it's tricky. And getting that right is going to take a lot more work, but at least we know we've got the basic functioning pieces down for that. MS. KYZER: Thanks, Dave.

John Donovan, did you have a question?

Q Yes, I do.

Let me first test Duncan, your gray eminence there, General. Did he pass on the e-mail I sent to him reference my chat with the secretary of the Army last week?

GEN. CALDWELL: (No response.)

Q Okay, deafening silence.

GEN. CALDWELL: Oh, you're talking about the blogging --

Q Yes, sir.

GEN. CALDWELL: Oh, absolutely, yeah. I thought it was -- I was trying to figure out -- gosh, I can't remember anything on 3-0, no. On blogging, yeah.

Q Yeah, but --

GEN. CALDWELL: He talked about it, because, you know, he has been our biggest champion.

Q Well, I should've tied that into the Small Wars Journal comment, because a lot was all wrapped in the sea change in the (CAC ?) website and the information and how it's organized, et cetera.

On to a question, though, that's relevant to what we're talking about. I noticed, going through it -- and, no, Lindy, I'm not cover to cover through it yet because I'm actually doing real work as well -- but we obviously -- we had interagency help in developing the manual. And the executive summary had interesting comments in it on some of the rueful way that they were cooperating, because they couldn't get the resources to do it themselves.

I was wondering, the socialization of this whole concept, both joint and into the Congress and elsewhere, so that those resources, not only those that the Army needs but that everyone else needs, how we're going about that.

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, you know what I would tell you is one thing we're fortunate with is the fact that the secretary of Defense is out there as late as this past week again talking about the fact that our interagency partners do not have the resources they need to participate and be a part of these efforts like we do.

General Casey has acknowledged that to us in our briefings with him on this manual on FM 3-07. When we've been briefing him along the way, he has stated multiple times that the reason he is comfortable with us doing and being as aggressive as we are with this approach is the fact that the interagency does not have the capability. They have the desire. They have the understanding of why it's important. But they do not have the capability to engage and be a part of it like, you know, we would like them. Their capacity

just doesn't exist. It's woefully inadequate, both in terms of people and monetary resources.

We know that they're also short of training. We've already started, with the Department of Defense, with Ambassador John Herbst and his folks, bringing them down to Fort Belvoir and putting them through a planning program effort that we've put together for them. And we're looking at how to further expand that and do it on a much larger scale so that we can continue training more of the Department of State personnel in the processes associated with the planning -- any kind of activity, not just a military operation, but any kind of activity and how you go through that in some sort of deliberate manner. So those kind of things we are working to do alongside of them.

USAID is another great example. They have put two officers into -- they did it last summer at the last minute, and they did it again this summer, into our School of Advanced Military Studies, our SAMS program, which is our, you know, key leadership program probably in the entire Army, where we put about 100 officers, Army officers, through there each year. And what they did with those two when they graduated this past May or June, they sent both of them into theater. One went to CENTCOM headquarters down in Tampa and the other one to the Multinational Force headquarters in Iraq. So they very much understood, "Send them to us; we'll train together for a year, educate together for a year, and then go out and employ together.

"

We're doing the same thing, too, with the Provincial Reconstruction Team efforts. Two weeks ago I was up with our folks at the Foreign Service Institute, FSI, here in Virginia. And we sat down and talked with Ambassador Joe Saloom, who's sort of taken the point for State and working Provincial Reconstruction Team training. They have a great program. They put their people through it. They're all volunteers, as you know, that will go do this. But we're trying to figure out, how can we integrate them more into our training centers so that, once they finish their educational experience and FSI, they then can then move to Fort Irwin, California and Fort Polk, Louisiana and actually go through a military rehearsal exercise with our units before we deploy into Iraq and Afghanistan.

Right now we use role players that we pay for to come down and perform those duties. But if we could, in fact, get them out of the school house, that would be a far better event for us too. So we are looking at ways that we can incorporate them into our training programs and provide training for them. And again, we're not interested in doing this at any kind of cost, we just want to do it because it'll be better for everybody long term if we can, in fact, make that happen.

Q Thank you, sir.

MS. KYZER: Thank you, John.

(Fibian ?) -- Salamander, did you have a question?

Q Yes. Thank you, Lindy.

Sir, congratulations on the publication of the document. I'm kind of like John. I'm trying to do that at the same time I'm trying to earn a living.

But from what I've read, it looks like you've really put together a good document.

GEN. CALDWELL: Thanks. That means a lot to us.

Q (Laughs.) Yes, sir. And if I could, I'd like to build off of something that John just mentioned. He spoke with then the U.S. contacts in training in bringing on the integrated approach that you discussed in the manual. But you look at many places where, for instance, in Afghanistan, the U.N. has the international lead, NATO has the military aspects lead. In a place like that, most of the PRTs are non-U.S.

How do you see on expanding our roots to a certain extent and bringing in our international partners in a similar way that you're trying to do nationally?

GEN. CALDWELL: We've actually had a lot of luck doing this side by side with our international partners. Probably what you may not see come out in the doctrine, but it's there, is that there's key pieces, like the comprehensive approach, the core theme of the manual. Actually we developed that hand in hand with our partners in the UK. We've had significant assistance from the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders. We actually had had input from South Africa, from Greece, Italy, Spain. And we've shared copies of the draft with virtually every country in Europe, and a lot of them throughout the Pacific as well.

So whether it comes to the surface or not, there's a huge international flavor to this. And that kind of collaboration is really important. We believe that we needed to get beyond just doing this in a whole-of-government environment, which is a lot of where our policy focus is now, and bring in the entire spectrum of practitioners, because there are so many other not just organizations and agencies that do this on a daily basis, but our allies as well.

And there's little value in developing this in an isolated environment, and so we brought them all in and we've talked.

I go overseas at least once or twice a year to host project teams with different allies so we can go over this again. We refine our approaches; we draw in pieces of their doctrine and they do the same thing.

So you'll see, worldwide, that this is growing in and of itself.

Q If I could have one follow-on, it sounds like, obviously, and I believe you said the 18 months you spent building this, in your travels and your interactions, you've probably developed quite an ad hoc brain trust, so to speak. Have you looked at taking this and kind of leveraging that brain trust you develop and had it looked -- look at it in an ongoing operation such as what we have going on in Afghanistan?

COL. LEONARD: That would be a terrific idea, and I think actually what you'll find in that brain trust, or what we like to call a community of practice, those people who are already actively involved in operations. A significant number of those folks at one time or another during the last 10 months have either left or come back from an operation in Afghanistan, Iraq, in Africa. And those discussions that you mentioned, that becomes a central part

of what we do. We can come down here for one or two days in D.C. and end up spending a week in an NGO downtown discussing these very things.

Because there's that much brainpower involved. You need to be able to leverage that for positive, immediate good, not just to look to the future, but a lot of the solutions that we've developed or we think we've developed have been put in practice fairly quickly by individual organizations.

We had -- the STRS's lead writer -- the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, their lead writer left at the six-month mark; took everything that we'd developed, packed it up in a backpack and went to Afghanistan to work on a PRT.

So immediate, actionable doctrine, I guess, is the result of that. But you make a good point.

GEN. CALDWELL: Another part I'd throw in there, too, is the -- in going through this effort, too, when we -- we started off probably a year ago, we talked to interagency, because that's what we thought was so important. Then we went to this whole-government kind of thought process, and it was really our allies that came back and started talking to us in terms of a comprehensive approach.

Because, they said, as you deal with people outside of the U.S. government, it's far more comprehensive in your approach to this than just your whole-of-government of the United States.

So as late as a month ago we were meeting with the lead director from ICRC, the International Commission (sic) for the Red Cross, out at Fort Leavenworth. And we sat down and went through the doctrinal manual again, another time. They've been through it many times.

We talked about the implications of certain parts and aspects of that. We talked about how important it was that we be able to work alongside of each other, recognizing that we're trying to ensure they can do their jobs without interference -- because we don't want to do their jobs -- and then at the same time, when they do, then how much it would benefit everyone in that host country that we're all operating in.

And then the fact of how we can get ICRC more integrated into our training centers so that when a unit is going through on their final mission rehearsal exercise before deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, ICRC will actually conduct some training for our troops out there and run some classes, so we have a better appreciation and understanding of what they will be doing in Iraq and/or Afghanistan before we arrive there.

Again, trying to provide everybody with the situational awareness and the understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations. MS. KYZER: Okay, this is Lindy again. To the extent that you're able, please use your drill sergeant's voice when asking questions. We're having some quiet audio here.

Next, Toby Nunn with Toby Nunn's Briefing Room. Do you have a question?

Q Absolutely. Good afternoon, gentlemen. First I want to applaud your efforts. This is actually one of the better FM's I've read in a while.



COL. LEONARD: Well, thanks --

Q It actually reads like a book that a simple infantryman like myself can understand, versus a bunch of mumbo-jumbo.

A lot of my questions have been addressed, but I want to touch on the comprehensive approach a little bit. You just gave a good overview, and it was very macro. I would like to touch on the micro side of that a little bit.

Being a young squad leader on my first tour in Iraq, looking blindly at my leadership who were unsure of how we were supposed to conduct ourselves, we first started walking in the streets and setting up these civil-military operations and stuff.

How are you planning on getting that down to the NCOAs and getting it out there so guys have a good, solid understanding of this doctrine?

GEN. CALDWELL: Toby, that's -- something we've been talking through.

Obviously, to put it into the Sergeants Major Academy is a much easier thing for us to do, and we've already -- (audio break) -- moving forward in that respect. And now it's being inculcated into their program of instruction in discussions and workshops this year.

For down into the Non-Commissioned Officer Academy programs that we send our sergeants, E-5s, to, and our staff sergeant and sergeant first classes, E-6s and E-7s, we still have work to do there, but are going to move forward in that area.

Because you're right; that is key to this. But we should be able to do it now that we've got the manual out.

COL. LEONARD: And Toby, I think you hit on a key point there. I take it as a compliment, but it's a really -- it's a key point that if it's readable, if it's understandable, it's a lot easier to institutionalize what's in there.

And part of that was -- as everybody knows, we have really great doctrine for the offense and defense. It breaks down into individual tasks and how you do those tasks. That's what we had to do here, which was break down some of the complex actions that had to be performed and put them in terms that a squad leader can take a look at, understand -- and it's just -- it's something discrete and identifiable.

Like you said, what you get out of walking down a street and looking people in the eye. That's something that's really important, but you put it in the context of how that applies in these types of activities, and it has great impact.

And you hit the nail on the head. If it's understandable and readable, people will internalize it. If not, we'll have to start all over again.

GEN. CALDWELL: And Toby, you had a great point there, too. As we wrote this, we recognized the fact that we've learned a lot of lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. But our mission, we knew, would need to be to write a manual that would transcend beyond just Iraq and Afghanistan.

Because we know for the next 15 to 25 years we're going to be in some sort of -- General Casey calls it an era of persistent conflict. It's the terminology we use to refer to it. But what we do know is that the world will be anything but normal.

And so therefore, with the challenges that are going to be out there in the next 10 to 15, 25 years, this kind of manual becomes very important for people to be talking about and dialoguing about.

And so we're hoping that through the publication of this manual we'll in fact generate much greater discussion than has taken place in the past.

Q Gentlemen, I absolutely agree, and this is definitely going to go on Toby's required reading list.

COL. LEONARD: Thank you.

Q The beauty of it is, like you said, we obviously don't need it for Iraq and Afghanistan; we need it for the future so the up-and-coming young leaders that have that mental leadership and that have that mental responsibility put on their shoulders will have a better understanding of how to greet these people out in the streets and how to incorporate them.

On the comprehensive approach, how -- is there any kind of ideas or plans on how to get those NGO representatives with our squad leaders and platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders so that we better understand exactly what it is that they're bringing to the battlefield?

COL. LEONARD: Toby, that's a key point. And they're more than willing to engage with us.

Because what I found out is when you engage with this community, that we actually share an awful lot in common. Their focus is -- obviously is on a humanitarian agenda, and I have a great amount of respect for that.

But they have the same mud on their boots that we do, and oftentimes they deploy a lot more than we do. They might not call it a deployment; they might have different rules of engagement, but they -- they're out there just as much as we are, and so you can proceed from a common degree of respect.

About all they ask from us that we give them the time, space, and distance to allow them to do their jobs. And the better they are able to do those jobs, the less likely it is that we're going to have to do their jobs for them. And I think we can all agree that that's good.

Because the more they're doing their jobs and performing the tasks, or the functions that we needed them to perform, the better we are able to focus our soldiers on the tasks that they're best at and where their skills are most applicable. And that's helping to establish the safety and security of these areas so that we can bring in our partners in the interagency, in the intergovernmental community, to do the things they need to do.

And it's all about respecting roles and missions, and when it comes to the humanitarian groups, it's just giving them time and space.

MS. KYZER: Thank you, Toby.

Matt Armstrong with MountainRunner. Do you have a question?

Q Yes, I do.

General and Colonel, this is a very impressive document. I see it as a linchpin to everything that we do, and compliment you on that.

I also want to echo Dave's comments on the CAC's blog. And General, the obvious and not-so-obvious push of your 4-Es into the USG domain. So this is a great document, and good on you for that.

I've got three questions. I'm just going to throw one out now, and if we have time to get to the other two, we'll get back to that.

But in the capacity-building discussion, one of the issues is you're always combating other people. You're always combating the bad guys' voice, their misinformation, their -- even destruction and interference with the reconstruction efforts.

What I didn't notice -- and I haven't read it all the way through, but I've been skimming through it and getting through different parts -- is -- I didn't see a great deal of empowerment of local -- quote, "local" voices, whether it's creating professional media, doing other things to empower.

There's, of course, in the SSR section how do you do the security, the different tiers in that. But in communicating what you're doing and why you're doing it, do you talk to how you get the local voices to communicate and spread the word?

COL. LEONARD: There's two pieces in the book to that, Matt. There's one discussion at the end of chapter two that talks about what we call information engagement. And part of information engagement is not only making sure that our own themes and messages are consistent across echelons of command and across efforts, but that there's a component of that to empowering those local voices.

At the end of the day, success is achieved through local actors taking action on their own behalf. And at some point they have to be able to be the voice forward; we can't always be the ones that do that.

And -- so there's a component to that, and it's reinforced at the end of chapter three. There's actually a discussion of how you do that, down to the task level and integrate that across the sectors. But that's a key piece, and I know General Caldwell could probably talk even more about it, since he's actually done it in the real world.

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, no, but you're exactly right. One of the key aspects, as we think about this entire manual, is we are working in support of others and we are there to empower the locals.

And those are probably two overarching themes we kept coming back to in discussions. When Steve would finish the next iteration and we had all come back together and huddled in dialogue about it was we need to always remember we're working in support of others, and it's all about empowering the locals so that they can take control of their lives and we don't need to be there anymore.

MS. KYZER: All right. Thank you, Matt. We'll try to get back to your other questions.

We have in the room Bryant Jordan with Military.com. Did you have a question?

Q Yes, I do.

I was reading over the document as quickly as I could. Two things jumped out at me, two questions, both of which are based on the American experience in the Middle East.

One is -- (audio break) -- be to -- (off mike) -- to help establish a judiciary.

Now, what is the -- is there an issue, is there (pigment ?) in the judiciary that the host country wants -- is founded on something that is -- (inaudible) -- religion, which is something we would not normally do, and I can't imagine the Army -- (inaudible) establish one.

The other thing is what happens when you put into the mix that the Army would provide security -- contractors coming into your -- (inaudible) -- to provide security. Again, you're all carrying weapons -- (inaudible) -- your role to do. They would not necessarily be in your chain of command. How does that fit into --

GEN. CALDWELL: Again, when we talk overarching philosophy, we talked a lot in terms of the -- what we called the three Cs, as we went through this.

The first one was the recognition that within military channels, we're going to be very much doing a coordinated effort between all the military entities -- Army, Navy, Air Force, sister services, multinational partners. It's very much of a coordinated effort.

Then the next level we have is the -- working with the U.S. government, the whole of government, the interagency and others like that where we work in a much more collaborative nature. We collaborate in what we're getting ready to go do.

And then there is the third phase, third element of it, which is all of our private organizations out there, non-governmental organizations. And there we're doing a cooperative -- we're working in a cooperative manner.

We probably all ultimately have the same goal, big overarching goal in mind to bring greater stability, basic services for the people, some level of governance, education; their basic needs. So when you talk about something like a contractor, that starts falling into that coordinating-with-them type role.

SOFAs will direct a lot of that in the countries. We could see a major shift even next year in Iraq, if you want to talk very specifically, and what contractors may or may not be able to do as the year 2009 rolls along, as these discussions continue. So in most cases I think we'll find that contractors -- what we hope to see is that stability operations, the basic fundamentals of what this manual kind of lays out would almost be seen being employed and used before perhaps even some kind of combat operations might have to take place.

We would hope then, if combat operations at some level did occur, that it's integral and very much in the forefront of the planning, the resourcing, so that it's there immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, already implemented and being executed.

But yeah, contractors will vary tremendously in terms of what the situation is and the rules of that nation's requirements for how they'll allow them to operate.

Now, there's those that will be there in support of the U.S. military - food services and some others. And I don't think that's probably the real question you're talking about, but it's --

Q (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL: Right. The security contractors. And I can see those changing very -- I can see other nations taking a much different approach to how they allow them to operate in the future, based on things that everybody's heard.

Q And the judiciary?

COL. LEONARD: I'll answer that one.

GEN. CALDWELL: Sure.

COL. LEONARD: That -- I had the same question yesterday from somebody else. And it goes beyond just the judiciary piece.

When we looked at the judicial sector, at the end of an operation, you want what they -- what we call rule of law. You want rule of law where the people are empowered, where the law serves the people, not necessarily the government.

And there's two different ways to approach this. We want rule of law, but oftentimes in these countries what we see is ruled by law, where the ruling authority maintains the -- maintains control over the civil populace by leveraging the law to their benefit. You don't want that.

Where that relates to the other half of the question is that there's three types of authority that we looked at. We only looked at two of them in the book. We look at --traditionally, what we see is civil authority, which is what you want.

You want to have a civil authority that uses rule of law to govern a populace and provide for the essential needs, safety and security of those people. That can be provided in a transitional fashion by a military authority, which we talk about in the book.

You hit the third leg of that, which is a religious authority. And no matter how hard we looked or how -- we actually had this debate as we developed the doctrine. Did we want to address establishing religious authorities or a religious judiciary -- say, a government that was based -- or a judiciary based on the rule of the Koran, for instance? And I don't think there's anybody with the expertise to do that, nor was that a topic that we felt was appropriate to address in Army doctrine.

Which in this book, there wasn't -- there weren't too many things that we declared off-limits, but that was one that we just felt was a little bit too far down the road for us to attack, although it exists.

But I don't think that anybody -- I don't think that our national -- our national interests push in that area that we would be trying to establish religious authorities.

MS. KYZER: Is anyone else on the -- again, this is Lindy. Is there anyone else on the line who has not yet asked a question who wishes to do so?

Okay, we'll go down the list and squeeze in any other questions that we can.

Spencer from the Washington Independent, did you have another question?

Q Yeah, thanks very much. I'll try and make it quick so everyone can get around, and Matt Armstrong speaking to the wisdom and awesomeness of MountainRunner asked the first one that I wanted to ask.

But if I could just ask, given that so much of this in the interagency, in terms of who does what specifically in Stab Ops, hasn't shaken out, how difficult is it to actually write, you know, a useful, practical handbook on something like this, in such a fluid situation? And how did you address that?

COL. LEONARD: That was probably the biggest challenge that we had to face. First of all, we had to get the door open, and not everybody initially was that comfortable with dealing with us, but we knew we needed to have a doctrine that addressed this. We knew we had to have a doctrine that really laid out roles and missions across the board because again, if you're just writing a doctrine that just deals with how -- what the Army does, then it's not going to be good enough.

We got the doors open and then after that it was a matter of keeping the doors open by establishing credibility, being responsive when they had questions, and accurately and honestly representing their interests as the writing commenced, and giving them a voice and a place at the table. The comprehensive approach is the best example of what came of this process because we initially spent about five months, maybe six months totally focused on whole of government -- that's what our strategy talks about, that's what policy talks about at the national level. And it was through the process -- that collaborative and cooperative process that it was our allies, the nongovernmental community that said, "Wait a minute; we're being left out of this. We're not part of the government." (Audio break) -- and I took that and went back. We discussed it at Fort Leavenworth and we adopted the comprehensive approach and pushed that forward, and it found great traction with everyone. And as you'll see, we still managed to keep a whole of government approach; it's just embedded within that comprehensive approach. And then that's how you -- that's how we ensured that we had everybody represented; that we accurately laid out roles and missions; and that we ensured that we can still work together in that collaborative, cooperative, coordinated manner that represents a comprehensive approach to stability operations.

MS. KYZER: Great. Dave Dilegge with Small Wars Journal, did you have a question?

Q Yeah, Lindy, I'll ask another one.

I kind of like the way the Army has laid out offense, defense, stability ops. And it seems that lately there's a proliferation of a lot of writing on irregular warfare. We're seeing the standup of centers and offices. Do we need the term irregular warfare? I'm just throwing that out for your thoughts on that. Thanks.

COL. LEONARD: Dave, we do. Irregular warfare is a useful term, although it's probably not very well defined. It's one of those things that you know it when you see it, but you may not be able to get the definition right the first time out. But it defines a very discreet range on that spectrum of conflict; specific activities, whether it's counterinsurgency, support to insurgency, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism -- things that we know what they are, they share similar rules of engagement, similar principles and fundamentals, and they really should share a common doctrine. So we need to explore those.

Where we run into problems, though, is that stability operations or the tasks that make up stability -- they span that entire spectrum, and we've run into some issues off and on, as you're probably well aware, of people trying to pigeonhole all of stability up underneath irregular warfare. But that doesn't work because then all of a sudden you leave the rest of the spectrum out.

But to get back to your question, yeah. We really do need to spend some time with irregular warfare and make sure that we understand that because you of all people recognize that the future, at least for the next several decades -- this is going to be the norm where a lot of conflicts are going to be of a smaller nature, very focused, very irregular or unconventional in many respects, and we're going to need to get down to brass tacks and break out exactly what those are and develop the same kind of intellectual underpinnings for dealing with those types of conflicts that we are now with stability and we have with major combat operations.

Q Thank you, sir.

MS. KYZER: John Donovan, did you have another question? I'll take that as a no.

Fabian Salamander, did you have another question?

Q Yes, thanks, Lindy. I have one.

General Caldwell mentioned a fact on the ground that perhaps we don't talk enough about -- the air of persistent conflict. In order to enable that, you need a little bit of strategic patience, and maybe it's a different manual all to itself. But what type of thought did Steve and his group go through, looking at the importance of strategic communications and public affairs, building that unity of message both in the host nation, but also in the home countries of ourselves and our allies to enable that strategic patience through these conflicts -- as described well in the manual are known as lengthy operations?

GEN. CALDWELL: That's a real good point. You know, we in the military have such a culture that's very adverse to the media. You know, we're -- we tend to sometimes label it under the "four A's." You have individuals who understand the importance of it, but yet they still avoid it. They don't always look at it as something that's -- you know, they look at it almost sometimes as

an annoyance rather than as a opportunity or an ability to communicate something that's critical.

And so you know, even, like, out at Command General Staff College, we have changed part of our curriculum this year so that in order to graduate, you have to actually conduct and be involved in four different kind of engagements. And this is minimum requirements, not maximum but minimum requirements. You have to conduct a media engagement -- you have to actually do a print, radio or TV live engagement. You have to write an editorial or article for publication and submit it -- it doesn't have to get published, but you have to at least have submitted it. You have to go out and do a public speaking engagement with an audience other than uniforms. And then you also have to blog. It's a requirement. So all four of those have to be done by every student while they're going through the Command General Staff College, with the intent, again, to change a mindset, a culture in our military to where we get more comfortable with the fact that we understand that there is -- in the 21st century, information is the currency and that we have to learn how to operate in the medium in a much more comfortable manner than we have in the past. And as such, you have to more empower your subordinates and give them much greater flexibility in how they get proactive in their means by which they want to get messages out.

So therefore -- as we call it out at Fort Leavenworth, we say we have to develop adaptive leaders who are creative thinkers. And that adaptiveness means they look at each situation where they're operating and figure out where are the influencers, where are the levers of information flow, and then figure out how to position themselves to be associated with that so that they can help also convey what's being done for what purposes, and just as importantly to get the feedback from the people to ensure that we are doing, one, what they would want to have done, and two, that they know why we're doing it.

And so there's a lot of ways we're trying to take that on other than just the manual so that we build that in as a way of thinking in our military leadership.

MS. KYZER: Toby, did you have another question? Q Just a quick one. Gentlemen, I apologize. I didn't completely -- (inaudible) -- so if I ask a question or this question was answered before, please direct me directly to the point.

Financial stewardship, when it comes down to the comprehensive approach -- I know, like -- in my experience, a lot of money filtered its way down into the hands of both uniformed and not uniformed people in an effort to stabilize where we were working. How -- is there a revision to the original plan, or is this, like, get more in debt than really help us find that financial stewardship and who exactly is going to be in charge and how to do it in a responsible manner?

COL. LEONARD: Well, Toby, I can tell you that national policy says that the State Department has the lead in these things. Whether they're appropriately resourced for it or not is always going to be a question.

You know, one thing that relates to what you said -- and I may not even be answering your question, but -- is the latest figures say that despite that -- despite the fact that we -- that State Department has the lead, 22 percent of the development budget now falls within the Department of Defense, and actually USAID's budget for development has dropped from 60 percent of what the nation



generates down to about 40 percent, which kind of gives the indication that maybe we probably all need to step back and relook how we allocate those resources, and is Congress resourcing the agencies appropriately? As General Caldwell mentioned earlier, are we getting the right resources in the right hands to do these types of things?

If that was the question you asked, I hope I answered it.

Q It did, sir. Thank you.

MS. KYZER: And back to Matt with MountainRunner.

Q Hi. Thanks. One question I wanted to ask but I'm not going to, but I'll throw it out there anyway was to get some more insight on the interagency conflict assessment framework. But going back to -- I just wanted to throw that out there.

But going back to the other question -- and you sort of spoke to this -- there was a comment thrown out into the blogosphere, and Aaron Simpson (sp) had thrown this out there, that there was an offer from Leavenworth to train State Department folks. Now, when I spoke with FSI -- people from FSI and at main State about this, they weren't aware of this and also voiced a concern that, you know -- or not concerned, but the obvious point that they don't even have the resources or the float to throw people down there. I may have just been talking to the wrong people, but can you tell me if that was true, and how do you see that actually working out? Because I think it's a great idea. GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. We -- right now the people that we are training are coming out of Ambassador John Herbst's area of stability and reconstruction within the State Department. But we have in fact offered up to every department and agency in the U.S. government the ability to send their personnel out to Fort Leavenworth to attend our 10-month intermediate learning education -- our Command General Staff College program, and that if they want to do that and they would like to have a military officer backfill that seat, we have officers available that we can put into it.

We offered it up last summer. We did not get everybody to take advantage of it in the interagency. It may have been just as much a educational thing for them, too, since nothing like that has been done before. We were able to get 14 people to partake of that and take advantage of it. We have seven officers in the interagency now because of that -- seven different agencies and departments did take advantage of it and ask for an officer back. General Casey had made up to 20 available, and then if we had used all those, to come back and ask for some more, so we could just talk numbers with them. But we didn't use all 20 he had available.

So it's a standing offer out there. We continue to engage with -- you know, I -- in fact I plan to be at Treasury on Wednesday and would hope to engage with the deputy over there. I have sent notes and have talked personally from everybody from the United States Coast Guard all the way down to other departments and agencies -- the FBI, the CIA, Commerce, Transportation, others, telling them that we really would appreciate them finding somebody in their midlevel, like our students, who are in their 10th and 15th year of service that can come out there and spend a year training with ours. We will charge them absolutely nothing.

They will come out with a Masters degree of military arts and sciences upon graduation. All we ask is that they pay for those people's salaries and

personal incidentals or whatever it is -- just take care of them themselves and their families, and we'll handle all the educational expenses associated with educating them with us.

Q Do you have other data or, you know, sheets on this that you could send out? I'd love to write more on this and get some of your own words out on it.

GEN. CALDWELL: Absolutely. We sure will. We'll get you some on that, then.

Q Great.

COL. LEONARD: Hey, Matt?

Q Yep?

COL. LEONARD: I'd like to throw out there too that General Caldwell is being a little -- he's done a lot more with FSI than we even talk about sometimes and that -- we went out to FSI and he actually addressed them, and as -- almost as a direct result of that, we're now seeing FSI open up their PRT course to Army personnel. And in return, what General Caldwell has offered is speakers, lessons- learned teams to come out and deal with their folks when they come right out of the field -- just a continued collaboration with FSI that will benefit us all in the long run.

Q Right.

MS. KYZER: Thanks so much, Matt.

We are actually a little bit ahead of our time, so we're going to go ahead and close out now.

Thank you so much, General Caldwell, for being here. Thank you, Colonel Leonard.

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. First of all, let me just -- I started off by saying it, but I just want to thank you all for what you do. I cannot thank the -- those who are out there, the mil-bloggers who are out there doing what you do every day. It's so critical to us in the armed forces. You're telling a story that is not always told. You're sharing experiences at the lowest levels that don't always get heard, and I appreciate you being a voice for those men and women and their families out there. And if there's anything we can ever do to assist, if you want to come out and spend two or three days at Fort Leavenworth and just interview majors and their families who have been deployed or might deploy -- you know, 85 percent of our students are previous deployers; 37 percent have had at least two; 18 percent have had three -- we'll be glad to set you up and do whatever you would like to do, but you're more than welcome. You can sit in classrooms. We'll allow you to observe and watch anything you would like to watch so you can see it all firsthand and gain a much better perspective yourselves.

And then the second thing I just said is, on this manual, we really do look forward to this helping drive more of the discussion out there in this area because it is very important. I know blogging will get at that. And our attempt today to launch this manual on a website -- the first time really that's been done. We've created a blog just for this manual launch, too, to help

capture the questions and the dialogue too so people can see that. And so we, you know, very much look forward to working with all of you all in this area.

MS. KYZER: Thank you so much again. You can find the transcripts and audio file at [www.defenselink.mil/blogger](http://www.defenselink.mil/blogger). This concludes today's roundtable. Have a wonderful day. Thank you everyone.

Q Thanks a lot.

Q Thanks a lot. Have a good night.

Q Thank you.

END.